

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NATO 08092

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: NATO, MPOL

SUBJECT: AN ANALYTICAL CAPABILITY FOR NATO

SUMMARY: ONE OF THE LONG-STANDING DEFICIENCIES IN NATO FORCE PLANNING IS THE LACK OF A CAPABILITY FOR SYSTEMATIC APPLICATION OF MODERN ANALYTICAL TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES. THIS DEFICIENCY IS EVIDENT IN THE BIENNIAL FORCE GOALS EXERCISE AND, MOST RECENTLY, IN ALLIANCE ASSESSMENT OF UK DEFENSE REDUCTIONS FOR FY-L978/79. MOREOVER, BUILDING ON AND EXPANDING THE CURRENT LONG-TERM DEFENSE PLANNING EFFORT WOULD REQUIRE AUGMENTING THE ALLIANCE'S WOEFULLY INADEQUATE CAPABILITIES IN THE AREAS OF DEFENSE PROGRAMMING AND COST ANALYSIS. WE BELIEVE THIS NEED TO IMPROVE NATO'S ANALYTICAL CAPABILITY WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY RECOGNIZED AS WORK PROCEEDS ON THE LONG-TERM INITIATIVES, WHICH COULD PROVIDE THE MOMENTUM FOR CHANGE. END SUMMARY.

1. ONE OF THE LONG-STANDING DEFICIENCIES IN NATO FORCE PLANNING IS THE ABSENCE OF AN IN-HOUSE CAPABILITY FOR SYSTEMATIC APPLICATION OF MODERN ANALYTICAL TOOLS AND
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TECHNIQUES THAT WOULD GIVE NATO THE MEANS TO ESTABLISH CLEAR PRIORITIES, IDENTIFY TRADE-OFFS WITHIN NATIONAL PROGRAMS, AND INTEGRATE NATIONAL DEFENSE PLANS TO SERVE OVERALL ALLIANCE NEEDS BETTER.

2. THIS DEFICIENCY IS REFLECTED CLEARLY IN THE BIENNIAL FORCE GOALS EXERCISE. FOR EXAMPLE, IN 1976 THE MILITARY

AUTHORITIES PRESENTED THE ALLIANCE WITH A FORCE PROPOSALS PACKAGE CONTAINING NEARLY 1100 INDIVIDUAL PROPOSALS, 40 PERCENT OF WHICH CARRIED THE HIGHEST PRIORITY. PRELIMINARY INDICATIONS ARE THAT THIS NUMBER MAY GROW TO 1500 FOR THE 1979-84 FORCE PROPOSALS PACKAGE, WITH A SIMILARLY LARGE PORTION CARRYING THE HIGHEST PRIORITY. IN ADDITION, FORCE GOALS SELDOM OFFER ALLIES A TRADE-OFF; THAT IS, THE DELETION OR MODIFICATION OF A LOWER PRIORITY PROGRAM TO FREE RESOURCES FOR A HIGHER PRIORITY ALLIANCE DEFENSE NEED.

3. THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES ARGUE, WITH CONSIDERABLE JUSTICE, THAT CLEARER PRIORITIZATION OF FORCE PROPOSALS AND RECOMMENDED REPROGRAMMING OF NATIONAL ASSETS, THOUGH DESIRABLE OBJECTIVES, ARE NOT POSSIBLE BECAUSE (A) COUNTRIES DO NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION ABOUT THEIR DEFENSE PLANS TO MAKE POSSIBLE A TRULY COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL PROGRAMS; (B) THEIR STAFFS ARE ALREADY OVERBURDENED; AND (C) PROPOSING ADJUSTMENTS IN COUNTRY DEFENSE PROGRAMS IS A POLITICAL ISSUE OUTSIDE THE PURVIEW OF THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES. HOWEVER, EVEN SHOULD THOSE OBSTACLES BE OVERCOME (AND SOME PROGRESS IS BEING MADE), THE ALLIANCE WOULD STILL BE DEFICIENT IN THE AREAS OF PROGRAM AND COST ANALYSIS SO NECESSARY TO AN IN-DEPTH REVIEW OF ALLIED DEFENSE PLANS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE TOTAL FORCE ANALYSIS CAPABILITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF RESIDES IN A SMALL OFFICE STAFFED BY THREE RETIRED MILITARY

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OFFICERS (ONE EACH FROM BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, AND THE UK), WHO DO NOT HAVE A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS BACKGROUND.

4. THE RECENT ROUND OF LARGELY PRO-FORMA "ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS" ON THE FY-1978/79 UK DEFENSE REDUCTIONS PROVIDES ANOTHER CLEAR EXAMPLE OF THIS SHORTCOMING. BECAUSE THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES DO NOT HAVE THE RESOURCES TO ASSESS ANALYTICALLY THE IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED UK REDUCTIONS PACKAGE TO INCLUDE POSSIBLE COMPENSATORY MEASURES AND ALTERNATIVES, THE ALLIANCE REPORT (MCM-53-77), AS PREVIOUS ASSESSMENTS OF UK DEFENSE CUTS, DOES NOT:

- . - PROPOSE OR EVALUATE ANY ALTERNATIVE METHODS TO OBTAIN THE SAVINGS;
- . - ESTABLISH ANY PRIORITIES FOR MAKING THE CUTS;
- . - MAKE ANY SUGGESTIONS ON WHAT OTHER ALLIES COULD DO TO SHIFT RESOURCES TO CORRECT THE HIGHEST PRIORITY DEFICIENCIES CREATED BY THE UK CUTS.

5. THE INITIAL STAGES OF THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM

(LTDP) PROVIDE FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THIS LACK OF ANALYTICAL CAPABILITY. EVEN NOW AS TASK FORCE DIRECTORS GRAPPLE WITH THEIR INDIVIDUAL PROGRAM AREAS, THEY ARE HAVING TO DRAW ON OUTSIDE CONSULTANTS AND NATIONAL EXPERTS FOR ANALYTICAL SUPPORT. SHOULD THE ALLIANCE CHOOSE TO BUILD AND EXPAND UPON THE RESULTS OF THE CURRENT TASK FORCE EFFORT TO MESH OR INTEGRATE THE INDIVIDUAL LONG-TERM PROGRAMS, RANKING OBJECTIVES AMONG PROGRAMS IN ORDER OF PRIORITY AND RECOMMENDING REPROGRAMMING OF ASSETS WITHIN COUNTRY PROGRAMS. FROM LOWER PRIORITY PROGRAMS TO HIGHER PRIORITY ALLIANCE DEFENSE NEEDS, THIS FOLLOW-ON EFFORT WOULD PLACE A PRE-

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MIUM ON THE NEED FOR AN EXPANDED ORGANIC ANALYTICAL CAPABILITY.

6. WE ARE AWARE THAT PREVIOUS TENTATIVE US EFFORTS TO PUSH THE ALLIANCE IN THIS DIRECTION HAVE FOUNDERED IN THE FACE OF BUREAUCRATIC RESISTANCE OR FLAGGING INTEREST. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT ALLIES AND RELEVANT NATO OFFICIALS WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY RECEPTIVE TO INTRODUCING AN IMPROVED FORCE ANALYSIS CAPABILITY INTO NATO AS WORK ON THE LTDP PROGRESSES AND THE NEED FOR SUCH A CAPABILITY BECOMES MORE EVIDENT. INCORPORATING AN IN-HOUSE FORCE ANALYSIS STAFF COULD BE VIEWED AS A MAJOR STEP TOWARD IMPROVING THE ALLIANCE'S PROGRAMMING AND IMPLEMENTING MACHINERY AS CALLED FOR IN THE LTDP.

7. IN THIS REGARD, WASHINGTON MAY WISH TO CONSIDER SEND-

ING ONE OR TWO SYSTEMS ANALYSTS TO NATO THIS WINTER TO
EXAMINE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR ENHANCING THE ALLIANCE'S
ANALYTICAL CAPABILITY, AND TO FORMULATE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
ESTABLISHING SUCH A FORCE ANALYSIS CAPABILITY IN NATO.

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8. ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON'S VIEWS. GLITMAN

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